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Climate change is a major challenge to international cooperation, as emphasized for instance by 
the Stern Review and various IPCC reports (Stern 2006 and IPCC 2007) but also many others. 
One of the main problems of achieving cooperation under international climate agreements is 
free-riding. Countries have an incentive to adopt a non-cooperative behaviour. Emission 
reduction constitutes a public good. No country can be excluded to benefit from the emission 
reduction of other countries. Moreover, by not contributing to emission reduction, a country 
saves on abatement cost. The Kyoto Protocol ran out in 2012, but all efforts to negotiate an 
effective follow-up protocol have failed up to now. The reason is not that no negotiations would 
have taken place, but simply that no proposal was yet formally adopted which sets emission 
ceilings such greenhouse gas emissions are stopped from further growing. In fact, we are looking 
for substantial fact cut backs on emissions in order to meet the widely accept target of not 
allowing the average global temperature to increase beyond 2 degrees Celsius. 
The seven papers in this special issue look at various important aspects related to the 
international dimension of climate policy. The first five papers are theoretical papers, the last two 
papers employ a climate simulation model combined with a game theoretic module to derive 
their results. Issues that are covered are for instance the problem of long-term commitment of 
governments to a proactive climate policy; the role of R&D in clean technologies, in terms of 
how they are induced through various policy instruments but also how spillovers and adoption 
of green technology can support international cooperation; the role of ancillary benefits for the 
success of climate agreements; the relationship between trade and climate policy; the design of 
supply-side climate policies to address the green paradox; the driving forces that support or 
undermine a unilateral climate policy without full participation and finally the role of fat tail 
distributions of uncertain damages on the performance of partially cooperative climate 
agreements. In the following, we summarize these papers briefly and encourage the reader to 
have a careful read of this excellent selection of papers, which span a wide range of very 
important topics in the current debate about an effective way forward in addressing the climate 
change problem. 
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Ulph, A. and D. Ulph, Optimal Climate Change Policies when Governments Cannot 
Commit   
Addressing climate change raises a wide range of issues which are intrinsically uncertain, the 
nature of this uncertainty exacerbated by the long-term nature of the climate change problem. 
Given that there are many dimensions to climate change uncertainty, questions emerge as to 
whether a “wait and see” approach is preferable to action now. For example, since we are unsure 
of future climate change projections and new technology that may be available, there may be a 
higher pay-off to delaying investment and developing policies to address these issues. An 
alternative view is that the “deep” uncertainty about climate change is no excuse for (at least 
some) action now. The paper by Ulph and Ulph presents an argument where inter-temporal 
uncertainty should lead to policy-makers creating greater incentives in the short-term with the 
result that commitment to addressing climate change is ‘front loaded’. The specific aspect of 
uncertainty in their paper is associated with the political process: given that governments are in 
power for a limited period of time, it may be the case that future governments may not have the 
same commitment to addressing environmental issues relative to the current one. The 
uncertainty here may reflect a wide range of factors that may affect a government’s priorities (for 
example, recession, financial crisis and so on) such that the emphasis on addressing climate 
change issues becomes diluted. While the current government may be clear about their 
environmental priorities and set environmental taxes consistent with this, the uncertainty 
associated with future governments’ intentions causes responses to differ compared with the 
case where this uncertainty about political priorities would not exist. 
Ulph and Ulph set up a two period model where the government in the current period has a bias 
towards environmental issues; there is however uncertainty about whether the bias will be 
sustained in the second period. The current government sets an environmental tax, but there is 
uncertainty what this tax will be in the next period i.e. there is a lack of commitment because the 
current government may not be in power in the next period. On the real side of the economy, 
there is a single firm that invests in R&D (the single firm assumption being employed to limit the 
externality associated with the firm not capturing the monopoly rent associated with invention 
i.e. the R&D externality does not exist). In principle, the environmental tax should encourage the 
firm to invest in more R&D, which will help mitigate the climate issue in the second period. But 
the uncertainty held by the firm about the priorities of the (different) government in the second 
period causes the firm to under-invest such that the political uncertainty is associated with too 
little R&D, irrespective of the optimal policy levels chosen by the current government. 
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In this context, the policy solution is to subsidise R&D; note that the R&D subsidy, in the 
presence of the political uncertainty, countervails the potential change in bias of the next 
government. It is necessary because the private firm is wary of the changing priorities of the 
government while the current government wants to ensure that there is some commitment to 
addressing environmental issues. Unlike a ‘wait and see’ approach, the R&D subsidy serves to 
embed the R&D now in face of the potential lack of commitment over environmental policy. 
Ulph and Ulph deal with a very real challenge: governments are typically short-lived (at least in 
the context of addressing climate change issues) and the reality of policy-making is that climate 
change has to compete with many other (often more immediate) issues on the government’s 
agenda. This is not to interpret the issue as the government (or the public that voted for it) 
caring less but that the policy agenda can be influenced by unforeseen events. This is different 
from the ‘wait and see’ scenario as the political uncertainty arises from the lack of commitment 
in an inter-temporal context where the government may change and the bias towards 
environmental issues may change with it. 
In the Ulph and Ulph set up, the solution to this lack of commitment is a subsidy on R&D, but 
the issue raises a more general question: if the issue is fundamentally one of political 
commitment, what alternatives are available that could effectively “tie the hands” of policy-
makers whatever the issues are faced by this or the subsequent governments? One possibility is a 
regulator that is independent of government (and therefore safeguarded from the short-lived 
constraints governments often face); another possibility is the commitment to international 
environmental agreements where any commitment made would be binding. These options are, 
of course, not problem-free but the question posed by the Ulph and Ulph paper highlights an 
important question about sustaining commitment to environmental policies over time. 
The authors suggested a number of possible extensions. One obvious extension would be to 
model a stock-externality problem with emissions also in period one. Another one would be to 
study a multi-country problem and consider whether joining the IEA gives a form of future 
commitment. One could also take into account the uncertainty about climate change and how 
the possibility of getting better information in the future may affect current policies.  
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Endres, A. and B. Rundshagen, Incentives to Diffuse Advanced Abatement Technology under 
the Formation of International Environmental Agreements 
New technology and the incentives associated in delivering it, features prominently in the paper 
by Endres and Rundshagen. In their context, there are two aspects to new technology; first, the 
differences in abatement technology that exist across countries; second, given that these 
differences exist, the issue of whether to diffuse and adopt better technology also becomes 
important. Focussing on diffusion and adoption, alternative environmental instruments will 
impact differently on the decisions of firms which, in turn, will impact on the effectiveness of 
these policies. Endres and Rundshagen address these issues in the context of international 
negotiations and, in doing so, also provide another insight into the (non-) equivalence between 
environmental taxes and emission quota schemes. 
To see the central notion in the Endres and Rundshagen paper, consider two firms in a national 
setting where one firm (with the superior technology) decides on diffusion, and the other decides 
on adoption. Suppose governments negotiate an environmental tax with the firms knowing that 
if they diffuse and adopt, the tax rate can fall. In this context, there are clear incentives to diffuse 
and adopt and, commensurate with this, socially optimal tax rates are chosen. Emission quotas, 
however, do not lead to the same outcome: if an emission limit is set by the government, the 
spread of new technology could lead to a stricter emission target (a higher tax equivalent); since 
the new technology means that stricter targets can be more easily met, this impacts negatively on 
the willingness of firms to diffuse and adopt. It is this inter-play between policy instruments and 
the incentives to diffuse and adopt that is the central focus of the paper by Endres and 
Rundshagen. Their specific contribution is to take these issues to the setting of international 
environmental negotiations where the issues become more complex and where decisions relating 
to diffusion and adoption not only involves technology transferring across borders but also 
influences the level of taxes and emission targets in the negotiations of an international 
environmental agreement. 
Specifically, in the international setting, there are two countries where one firm exists in each but 
where one of these firms has the superior technology and where the incentives to diffuse and 
adopt now involve cross-border issues. In the context of international negotiations, one country 
is labelled as the ‘bottleneck’ country, where this is defined as the country that is willing to make 
the lowest offer either in terms of a uniform emission tax or uniform emission reduction quota. 
Under the environmental tax regime, the ‘bottleneck country’ is the country with the superior 
technology; the main outcome is low taxes (or at least taxes below the social optimuml) and low 
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diffusion since the burden of higher taxes would fall mainly on the superior technology country 
which in effect is subsidising the other country. This leads to low taxes and lower diffusion to 
limit this cross-country subsidisation effect. This contrasts with the national setting since there 
are always incentives to diffuse and adopt as it would lead to lower taxes in subsequent periods. 
Under the emission quota regime, the ‘bottleneck country’ is the country with the inferior 
technology which would negotiate for less strict emission levels. Incentives to adopt are now 
weaker since adoption of the new technology will result in tighter emission levels being set in the 
future. 
Comparing the negotiation outcome of the two regimes in the case of asymmetric damage 
functions, the equilibrium in terms of pollution abatement as well as technology diffusion and 
adoption may be welfare superior in the quota regime compared to the tax regime, despite the 
quota regime’s cost-ineffectiveness. This may hold in the case of identical damage functions. The 
reason is that the negotiated equilibrium emission reduction might be higher in the case of 
countries negotiating quotas instead of taxes. 
Setting the specific features of the model aside, Endres and Rundshagen address two key issues 
that are important for future research. First, R&D issues are not just about the development of 
new technology but also about diffusion and adoption and even where new technology exists, we 
also have to think about the incentives associated with these decisions. There is also a potentially 
important inter-play between these decisions and the choice of policy instruments. Second, the 
insights produced here highlight another dimension which is of relevance to research on 
international environmental agreements. Specifically, the issues are not confined about whether 
to join an international agreement and what policy instruments and targets to set but also about 
the diffusion and adoption of technology across borders and how the incentives associated with 
the latter can, in themselves, impact on the choice of instruments and the policy levels to set. 
The authors suggest that future research may look at the effect of combinations of policy 
instruments such as using a subsidy instrument to encourage diffusion and adoption of new 
technology. Further extensions may consider other forms how technical progress emerges and 
property rights issues associated with new technologies. 
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Finus, M. and D.T.G. Rübbelke, Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The 
Case of Climate Agreements  
Combating global warming will not only generate global public benefits (primary benefits) of 
slowing climate change, but also private benefits (secondary benefits), sometimes referred to as 
ancillary benefits or co-benefits. Ancillary benefits stem from mitigation measures which, as a 
side-effect, also reduce for instance local pollution. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
secondary benefits can be quite large, in particular in developing countries, and may even exceed 
the primary benefits. Intuition would suggest that if governments take this secondary benefits 
into consideration, this should increase their willingness to participate in a climate agreement. In 
other words, making governments aware of ancillary benefits of climate policy should be 
conducive to the success of climate agreements. Whether this intuitive reasoning is correct is the 
central question analysed in Finus and Rübbelke in this issue. The authors use a simple two-stage 
non-cooperative coalition formation model where in the first stage countries decide upon 
membership in an agreement and in the second stage choose their abatement levels. The public 
good part of the benefits from mitigation calls for policy coordination and hence makes free-
riding attractive as in the standard model.  
The authors show that the more important ancillary benefits are in governments’ objective 
function, the higher will be global abatement. This is true in the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium and the social optimum, but is also true for partial cooperation where some 
countries cooperate but maybe not all. However, the question is whether ancillary benefits make 
a difference in relative terms. Therefore, the authors measure global welfare (the sum of payoffs 
over all players) in relative terms which is called the closing the gap index. This index measures 
the difference between what is achieved in a self-enforcing climate agreement and the non-
cooperative equilibrium, in relation to the gap between the social optimum and the non-
cooperative equilibrium. As analytical solutions for general payoff functions cannot be obtained, 
the authors consider three model versions, which have been frequently analysed in the literature. 
The first version assumes linear benefits and linear costs from abatement, the second version 
linear benefits and quadratic costs and the third version quadratic benefits and quadratic costs. 
Benefits comprise primary benefits from global abatement and secondary benefits from own 
abatement. 
The authors show that participation decreases in version 1, remains constant in version 2 and 
may slightly increase at the margin in model version 3. In terms of relative welfare, the closing 
the gap index decreases in model version 1, remains constant in version 2 and may increase or 
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decrease in model version 3, though any increase will only be marginal. In the first model, 
ancillary benefits lead to a smaller coalition as they reduce the threshold of countries necessary 
for an agreement to be profitable. In the other two models, ancillary benefits increase not only 
abatement and payoffs of coalition members but also of outsiders, which leaves the free-rider 
incentives (more or less) unchanged. The rationale is that countries taking the private ancillary 
benefits to a greater extent into account will undertake more emission reduction, irrespective of 
an international agreement. In other words, these benefits may provide an additional incentive to 
participate in international agreement but also an additional incentive to free-ride. In this respect, 
the counter-intuitive result appears intuitive, and in line with previous papers which showed that 
if agreements have to be self-enforcing, though they improve upon the non-cooperative 
outcome, fall short of the globally optimal solution. Hence, unfortunately, making governments 
aware of the importance of ancillary benefits of climate policy will not do the trick to unlock the 
deadlock of current climate change negotiations; this will require other measures. 
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Vlassis, N., The Welfare Consequences of Pollution-Tax Harmonization  
A key concern of countries contemplating a carbon pricing policies is the fear that their 
competitive position will be jeopardised by ‘carbon leakage’ as production might shift elsewhere. 
These countries would prefer if others cut their emissions too, thereby avoiding bearing the cost 
of carbon reduction alone as well as benefiting from matched carbon reduction. To overcome 
this problem, international coordination in climate policies is required. The author—within a 
perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of international trade in which pollution is a by-
product of production—investigates the welfare properties of a particular form of pollution-tax 
harmonisation, paying particular attention to the allocation of the revenues collected. The 
pollution-tax harmonisation reform takes the form of moving the pollution-tax vectors (starting 
from any initial equilibrium) towards an appropriately weighted vector (with the weights being 
the countries’ output responses to carbon taxes). With respect to the allocation of revenues, the 
analysis considers two cases: one in which the revenues are distributed to the consumers in a 
lump sum fashion, and one in which they finance public abatement.  
The author shows that, starting from any arbitrary non-symmetric pollution-tax distorted 
equilibrium, the pollution-tax harmonisation reform delivers potential Pareto improvements. The 
intuition for this is that the convergence of pollution tax vectors towards a weighted average 
induces efficiency gains in the production of the tradable goods (and so the intensity of the 
pollution in all countries), and, as a consequence, tax revenues are being distributed to the 
consumers making everybody better off. Intuition suggests (and the analytics in the paper 
confirm it) that these efficiency gains remain if public abatement is introduced (financed by the 
tax revenues), and welfare improvements can be realized under certain conditions on the 
marginal valuation of those revenues.   
The paper suggests avenues for future research such as extending the framework of the analysis 
to search for reforms that deliver strict Pareto improvements (in the sense that all countries 
strictly gain from such reforms) and to investigate the role, if any, of non-tradable goods.  
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Asheim, G., Distributional Argument for Supply-Side Climate Policies  
Climate policies have predominantly focused, with some notable exceptions, on demand-side 
instruments to control greenhouse gas emissions. This paper puts forward a distributional 
argument for the use of supply-side policies whereby carbon emissions are controlled through 
depletion quotas or some permanent confiscation of a fraction of the in situ carbon stock. The 
distributional effects are identified within the Cobb-Douglas version of the Dasgupta-Heal-
Solow-Stiglitz model of capital accumulation and costless resource extraction. It is assumed that 
atmospheric absorption capacity is a non-renewable and exhaustible resource, the resource stock 
is homogenous, and announced policies are perceived to be credible. The author analyses the 
properties of six policy instruments (implemented by a global government): two demand-side 
(emission taxes and emission quotas), and four supply-side ones (depletion taxes and depletion 
quotas which can be auctioned off or allocated freely).  
The analytics show that both of the demand-side instruments implies confiscation of the entire 
resource wealth and the allocation of the property rights of the cumulative absorption capacity 
emitted resource to the government. If emission quotas are allocated freely, the entire resource 
wealth is still to be confiscated but the property rights to the cumulative absorption capacity 
emitted resource input is allocated to the capital owners. Under depletion taxes or auctioned 
depletion quotas, the results are identical to the corresponding demand policy: confiscation of 
the entire resource wealth and the property rights of the cumulative absorption capacity emitted 
resource input is allocated to the government. If the depletion quotas are allocated freely, then 
the property rights are to be allocated to the resource owners, which, in turn, implies that net 
confiscation of the resource stock is limited to the fraction not produced. In a next step, the 
author examines the possibility of a compensated confiscation of resource stock (meaning that 
the fraction confiscated is purchased at market prices from the resource owners and put into a 
permanent reserve). The result suggests that in addition to the fact that the property rights are 
allocated to the resource owners, they also receive compensation for part of the resource stock: 
in doing so, this scheme over-compensates the resource owners at the expense of the 
government, as their income share is increased in absolute terms. Under uncompensated 
confiscation of the resource stock, the distribution of income between capital owners and 
resource owners is preserved.  
The author also relaxes the assumption of a global government and considers a two-country 
world (under competitive markets with perfect capital mobility and free trade in the resource) in 
11 
 
which one of the countries is the capital stock and the other the resource stock owner and 
identifies the distributional effects of the above six policies. The results suggest that only three of 
the supply-side policies lead to unchanged distribution when moving from a situation where the 
resource constraint of absorption capacity is binding to a situation where the climate threshold is 
binding. Moving to partial participation or compliance, demand-side policies will be wasteful and 
have no long-run climate effect. Perhaps not surprisingly, supply-side policies are optimal if 
implemented by the country endowed with the resource.  
The author shows how permanent confiscation, without compensation, of a fraction of the in 
situ carbon resources, large enough to avoid serious climate change preserves the distribution of 
income between capital owners and resource owners, compared to the case where no climate 
policy is in place. Furthermore, he shows that this solution can also be obtained by depletion 
quotas but not by other considered alternatives. Such observations are of interest as avoiding 
redistribution may facilitate climate change negotiations.  
Finally, the author discusses issues, which must be resolved in order to implement a supply-side 
policy that seeks to leave the distribution unchanged. The first issue is the selection of the 
medium-extraction-cost carbon resource that should be left in situ and put in a permanent 
reserve as well as the flexibility of future re-evaluation. The second issue is that owners of 
medium-extraction-cost carbon resources should be compensated by owners of low-extraction-
cost carbon resources. The third issue is that the authority responsible for resource confiscation 
should be in the resource-host country. Finally, the confiscated resources should not be assumed 
to be available at a later point, otherwise current fossil fuel prices will not be affected.  
  
12 
 
Bosetti, V. and E. De Cian, A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral 
Climate Action   
Partial cooperation on the provision of a global public good can fail to be environmentally 
effective. On the one hand, pollution reduction by the coalition might be below the optimal 
levels of abatement. On the hand, the reaction of non-signatory countries might be to increase 
pollution compared to the case when no agreement is in place, typically called leakage. Whether 
this is the case or not depends on number of forces. In this paper, the authors argue that when a 
subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory 
countries reflects the interaction between three factors: a) the incentive to free-ride on the 
environmental benefits of cooperation in the form of reduced environmental damages (called 
damage effect), b) the incentive to expand energy consumption due to a drop in energy prices 
(referred to as energy market effect) and c) the incentive to adopt cleaner technologies 
introduced by the coalition (called technology effect). The first and second effect contribute to 
leakage, the third effect works in the opposite direction. Focusing on partial cooperation 
between OECD countries (coalition members), the authors’ central question is to identify an 
emission target by the OECD countries that could trigger a proactive response by non-signatory 
nations, i.e. the leakage effect is negative. A central role in answering this question is diffusion of 
clean technology, including the role of learning-by-research and learning-by-doing. Results are 
tested with a number of robustness checks which includes the structure of energy markets, 
energy supply and international trade elasticities, substitution possibilities in final production, 
speed of innovation, composition and differences in climate damages.  
The authors use the integrated assessment model WITCH (World Induced Technical Change 
Hybrid model) with endogenous technical change that accounts for the relative price of fossil 
fuels which depends on the stringency of the climate policy, the scarcity of fossils, the speed of 
technology diffusion and the price elasticity of energy demand. Furthermore, whether a new 
technology is adopted by non-signatory nations or not depends also on its price relative to that 
of fossil fuels. The model incorporates a detailed representation of the energy sector in an inter-
temporal growth model of the economy. World’s regions make inter-temporally optimal 
decisions about R&D-investments, abatement and consumption. The solution of the game is a 
Nash equilibrium between coalition members acting as a single player, internalising the 
externality among their members and the remaining non-members, acting as singletons. Fossil 
fuel prices are influenced by the global use of exhaustible resources and the way technical change 
is modelled accounts for spillovers of international knowledge and experience. The robustness of 
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the results is tested across alternative model specifications and challenged through extensive 
sensitivity analysis. The authors recognise that WITCH model does not represent all possible 
sources of global interactions. More specifically, international trade of capital and fossil fuels is 
not fully captured and therefore terms-of trade effects are not considered. Nevertheless, it has to 
be pointed out that WITCH is probably one of the most detailed integrated assessment models, 
in particular when considering that the authors analyse not only the Nash equilibrium and the 
social optimum but also consider the possibility of partial cooperation. 
The game-theoretic model comprises a two-stage non-cooperative simultaneous, open 
membership game. In the first stage, countries decide on their membership and coalitions are 
formed. In the second stage, countries choose their economic strategies in an inter-temporal 
setting. In this paper, the authors focus exclusively on the second stage of the game and fix the 
first stage by focusing on the coalition of OECD countries, abstracting from the analysis 
whether this coalition would be stable.  
Results show that the equilibrium abatement of the coalition composed by OECD-countries 
would be moderate, in line with pledges subscribed in the Copenhagen Accord. These pledges 
lead to a reduction of 2050 emission by 30-35% below 2005 levels. The mitigation strategy 
would consist of investments in R&D in the energy sector and deployment of cleaner 
technologies with high learning potential. Clearly, this reduction seems small when compared to 
what would be required to stabilise global warming below 2 degrees. However, it is at least a 
modest step forward and it induces a proactive response by non-OECD countries, which also 
reduce their emissions even though they are not committed to the climate agreement. This 
proactive response is due to international knowledge spillovers and technology transfers that 
counterbalance the energy market and damage effect and give non-OECD countries an incentive 
to switch to cleaner technologies. In other words, international knowledge and technology 
externalities would facilitate the diffusion of cleaner technologies to non-signatory countries, 
offsetting the free-riding incentive. Technology externalities can occur through climate policy 
linkages such as Clean Development Mechanisms under Kyoto Protocol, trade flows and 
multinational enterprises or skilled-labour mobility.  
This result is the consequence of two factors. First, the OECD regions’ effort is moderate. A 
large fraction of damages occurs in non-OECD countries and therefore is not internalised by the 
OECD coalition. Thus, the damage effect is rather small. Second, as abatement is moderate, the 
influence on international fuel prices is contained. That is, the energy market effect is relatively 
small. Both effects would be much higher in a scenario where the OECD group cut emissions 
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beyond the equilibrium level, pursuing reduction rates of 40-45% below 2005 levels in 2050. It is 
shown that the benefits of technology externalities in this case would no longer compensate the 
effect of lower fossil fuel prices and lower damages.  
These conclusions suggest that a moderate unilateral climate policy may be more effective than a 
very ambitious policy and that the international transfers of technologies and knowledge can play 
an important role for an effective mitigation climate policy. It is clear that such an interesting 
policy relevant analysis should be extended in future research by explicitly considering stability of 
coalitions. This would provide a more comprehensive view which climate policy strategies are 
effective in a second-best world. 
Dekker, T., R. Dellink and J. Ketterer, The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate 
Agreement 
International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the 
impacts of climate change are very large.  Regional differences in the costs and benefits from 
emission reductions also complicate the international coordination for combating climate 
change. The efficient level of mitigation efforts can be attained through global cooperation, e.g. 
by forming an international environmental agreement (IEA). However, there is a large incentive 
to free-ride as non-cooperating countries benefit from cooperating countries mitigation efforts. 
Furthermore, the absence of supra-national authority which can enforce participation and high 
mitigation levels means that international agreements must be self-enforcing.  
One key uncertainty is probability of very large climate damages, the right-hand side tail of the 
damage cost distribution. The higher the likelihood of these events, the more they will influence 
the optimal policy response. In other words, policy response outcomes are highly sensitive to 
high-consequence low-probability impacts. In this paper, the authors examine the influence of 
increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the “fat 
tail” of the damage cost distribution, on the formation, stability and performance of IEAs. Using 
the stochastic version of the calibrated game-theoretic climate simulation model STACO, the 
authors systematically vary the shape and location of the distribution of climate change damages 
to analyse the extent to which IEAs would be affected. The STACO model consists of twelve 
world regions. Like the model by Bosetti and De Cian, coalition formation is modeled as a two 
stage process in which regions choose membership first and then their economic strategies. 
Different from this paper, stability of coalition in the first stage is tested by applying the concept 
of internal and external stability. Due to uncertainty, the concept of stability likelihood is used 
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which has been introduced in the literature before. The model links uncertainties about costs and 
benefits of mitigation efforts to the stability likelihood of coalitions, relating this to the variance 
in regional benefit shares of mitigation as well as the variance and level of the global benefit 
parameter. Distributions are generated via Monte Carlo Simulations. Asymmetries across 
coalition members are accounted for through an optimal transfer scheme. 
This paper shifts focus from general uncertainty analysis to assessing the impact of the 
probability of highly disruptive climate change damages on the stability and performance of 
climate coalitions. Fat tails in the distribution of mitigation benefits are introduced by increasing 
the variance of the global benefit parameter and opting for asymmetric distributional shapes. 
They assess the impact of fatter upper tails of on stability and the overall performance in welfare 
terms by measuring welfare in relative terms compared to the two benchmarks no and full 
cooperation. Regions’ responses to uncertainty depend on the extent they learn about the true 
parameter values. Three types of learning are distinguished: no learning, partial learning and full 
learning.  
The simulation runs confirm that also non-participants in an IEA will undertake abatement 
efforts relative to their BAU scenario, which increases with expected benefits from mitigation 
and the fatness of the right-hand side tail of the benefit distribution. Results also show that by 
not being part of a coalition, regions are likely to conduct less abatement not only because they 
behave non-cooperatively but also because they do not benefit from burden sharing schemes 
(monetary transfers) between members of the coalition. Furthermore, the fat-tail scenarios show 
that countries are willing to form coalitions to reduce the risk of irreversible climate damages. 
The authors find that both, higher expected benefits and fatter upper tails of climate impacts, 
increase the stability likelihood of an international climate agreement and overall welfare. Finally, 
the authors point out that nevertheless, there remain significant difficulties in striking an 
ambitious international agreement with broad participation. The payoff functions from this 
analysis show that mitigation costs are substantial and hence the free-riding incentives make it 
hard to form large stable coalitions, known from other models before. 
In conclusion, increasing the likelihood of very high damages induce that more ambitious 
coalitions are stable with better performance. In other words, they conclude fatter tails imply 
more successful, or “fatter” international climate agreements. 
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